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TEST AND EVALUATION ASPECTS OF THE NIMBUS II
PROGRAM USEFUL TO OTHER LONG LIFE SPACE PROGRAMS*
S. Charp
Consulting Scientist
. General Electric Company
Missile and Space Division
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
the spacecraft's development history to the
on-orbit performance?

The Nimbus II satellite has been in orbit 20
months (to January 15, 1968), operating well with
in design specifications as a carrier spacecraft
for meteorological instruments.

The planned life of Nimbus was six months at
the time of the start of the program, long by any
then-existing demonstrated performance. The payloads were new and at the edge of the state-of-art .
Man's knowledge of the space environment was quite
meager. As a space carrier for experimental-type
meteorological instruments, the life required of
the spacecraft should be at least that of the most
significant instruments being evaluated. Con
versely, to be most effective, a spacecraft capable
of a six-month life should carry instruments like
wise designed to live for six calendar months.
Thus the life requirements and demonstrated per
formance for the spacecraft and its housekeeping
electronics equipment can be treated separately
from that of the "passengers".

This spacecraft includes a three axis active
attitude control system which itself is more com
plex than many other satellites and their included
payloads. An essential element of the total
development of Nimbus is the intensive and exten
sive test and evaluation programs at the General
Electric Company, to which the prototype/qualifi
cation and flight spacecraft were exposed, coupled
with selected design features which contribute to
long life. Although a rigid causal relation can
not be established between the programs' adminis
trative and technical activities associated with
the design of the spacecraft, integration of payloads and the test and evaluation program, and
the long-life on-orbit performance experienced,
they are considered important contributing factors.
This paper reviews: the essential elements of the
General Electric Company's program, long-life
aspects of the spacecraft f s basic design, the
fundamental philosophies which guide the test and
evaluation program, the multiple nature of the
test and evaluation program, review and analysis
of failures encountered in the systems test pro
grams from fabrication to alunch and of anomalies
encountered in the orbital performance, and some
representative lessons learned from the program
which can be applied directly to other long life
space programs.
I.

What constitutes the orbital success of Nimbus
II? In-orbit success must be measured only in
terms of the performance of the bus. Did the bus
function in orbit in a way to allow the payload
instruments to perform their intended functions
over a time period of at least six months? From
the point of view of the research and development
mission, the entire Nimbus II orbital program was
an unqualified success. To a somewhat lesser
degree Nimbus I was almost as successful in spite
of its near-one-month life, because in its time
environment the total data taking mission was more
successful than had actually been anticipated,
prior to flight, by those individuals close to the
program.

Introduction

To what factors can the a posteriori success
of a single long life spacecraft be attributed?
Causal relations are hardly likely to be devel
oped between the flight performance of a single
spacecraft and planning methods, procedures, tests
and evaluations. A more meaningful answer to this
question can be had by outlining the activities at
the General Electric Company which preceded the
successful flight; and relating these to a. review
and analysis of the failures which occurred during
flight. If similar analyses were made with
respect to other programs of like complexity,
which, resulted in long .life (greater than one
year) orbital performance, and the respective data
were examined for commonalities, then perhaps
collectively causal relations could be derived.

The Nimbus II spacecraft was launched into a
near polar orbit in the early morning of May 15,
1966, and has been performing its planned func
tions well within its design specifications for
over 1.6 years at the time of this writing. The
Nimbus I spacecraft was launched into a similar
orbit in the early morning of August 28, 1964,
and lasted for 26 days, at which time the solar
array drive ceased rotating and power was
depleted. Both spacecraft were unqualified
successes in 'terms of their useful operating life
and in terms of the vast amounts of meteorological
data acquired by the payload f s sensors and
collected by the data center. These spacecraft
were launched without benefit of prior engineering
flight tests to assess potential orbital weak
nesses. To what degree is it meaningful to relate
'cThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration*
Goddard Space Flight Center, Nimbus Project Office,.
Greenbelt, Maryland, has Systems Management respon
sibility for the series of Nimbus spacecraft* Under
contract to this group, the General Electric
Company, Spacecraft- Department, designed and devel
oped the three axis, active stabilization and atti
tude control system; designed, developed! and
fabricated the spacecraft structure, thermal con
trol system, and various components; integrated
experiments and meteorological sensors; and tested
the complete spacecraft.

Constrained by data accumulated from only a
single example of a long life complex spacecraft,
it is clear a causal relationship which defines a differential sensitivity between 'What and low
things were done and in-orbit performance cannot
be. established on the basis of scientific, techni
cal, and logical considerations,, Neither is it:
meaningful to dogmatically state and assign,
requirements for activities which.,, if conducted,
would insure successful orbital performance, with
a p reassigned, numerical assessment of reliability*
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3.
Mechanical and electrical interfaces
were very loosely defined for Nimbus I, but some
what more tightly for Nimbus II.

The GE responsibilities as a major contractor
to the NASA/GSFC Systems Manager were:

4.
Sensor/pay loads and spacecraft design
represented advanced state-of-art , with their
understanding and appreciation maturing as the
efforts progressed.

1*
Conduct detailed electrical and mech
anical design studies.
2.
Design, build, test, and evaluate the
stabilization and attitude control system to '
broadly defined goals/specifications.

5.
A comparatively short development time
existed,, considering the absence of a technical
baseline design from which to grow,

3.
Design, build, test, and evaluate the
passive and active thermal control system,

The complexity of the control system, with

its own composition of basic elements provided by
many internal design, groups and external vendors,
resulted in problems of program management similar
to those encountered by the multiplicity of
CO' -con tractors. Supporting the GE in-house efforts
was the entire complex of NASA/GSFC, including,
but not limited to personnel from groups concerned
with: equipment., and component design; materials;
test and evaluation; reliability; tracking and. data
systems ; and most important , the NASA/GSFC Nimbus
Project group itself* 'The devoted effort of the
NASA/ Indus try team jointly attacking problems as
they arose in these, sample areas may be considered
am essential factor in the resulting long life.

4.
Design,, build, test, and evaluate the
antenna systems, based upon a feasibility study
provided by the University of New Mexico,
5*
Design, build, test, and evaluate the
spacecraft structure to the general outline and
systems design provided by NASA/GSFC,

6.
Design, test, and evaluate all models*
Including: full-scale mock-up (pre-prototype) ;
prototype ; flight; structural dynamics; antenna;
thermal; separation.
7*

Integrate all equipments/components

into the several models spacecraft (engineerings,
prototype/qualification, flight)* conduct inte
grated systems level tests and evaluate the per
formance under a wide range of environmental
conditions.

Ill ,
A.

Except for the comparatively simple spin
stabilized spacecraft, which have demonstrated
extremely long; life records, Nimbus has demonstrated
the longest life in orbit of the complex spacecraft.
16 a not inconsiderable extent, this performance nay
be attributed to the depth to which this spacecraft
and its related ground systems vere conceived,
analyzed, planned t and conceptually integrated.
before extensive detailed design effort occurred.
In essence, .Nimbus is well "system engineered",
with the system design obviously being the result
of thorough consideration having been given to
mission objectives and test, qualification and
evaluation requirements »

8.
Provide the adapter structure to the
launch vehicle.
9.
Design and fabricate all special test
and ground handling-equipment for the spacecraft*
10'*
Integrate the ground stations required •
to coronand» teat,
evaluate the spacecraft at
the plant
in Alaska•
lit
Design and provide computer programs
for engineering evaluation at the plant and for
operational evaluation during flight*

The basic hardware design was planned to
provide means for extensive evaluation of the space
craft through its environmental test program, and
s isolated ., opera t iona lly-controlled , orbital flights
In both ambient and vacuum/ thermal environments*
Conservatively high estimates of the environmental
stresses expected to be encountered by the space
craft were selected, these being embodied In both
the environmental specifications and designs »

11*
Provide operational systems engineer
ing to evaluate in*flight performance
lift*off to completion of in»orbit system checks*
II*

Ba s ic De s i.gn Cons idera t ions
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Provide launch support services*

14*
Bstablish, staff» and operate the
Technical Control Center it M,SA,/iSFG in

suppo11 § f orbi ta1 oper*tions.

overall system design recognised the
dearth of quantitative design data and the prepon
derance of qualitative design factors* A priori
confidence of success fill orbital performance
provided to the engineering design with a **test»
evaluate* re-design » re- test** or **test - fiat - test*
philosophy :s such that iterative application of
these elements would result In a control system
in m spacecraft which would have but twill tlfcell*
hood of failure after launch.

For a number of reasons* teat and evaluation
(concept if "test/fix11) occupies mm essential
portion of the activity;
I*
Minibus Is a complex spacecraft* having
i, cwpltx control system and i, variety of individ*
'lit! senior
loads»
1*
Many co*contree tors, each an indepen
dent contractor to NASA/GSFC» provided equipment
services to tint spacecraft tt *
but
iaii no tittrit eontrtetuel
responsibility to the integration end teet ecu-

* I, formil redundancy policy did
nevertheless* fu&etio&fcl end block

it, 1

wist,
is

provided as failure protection at the system, level
in several ways. These can be categorized as
being related to the overall aerospace/ground
system, the spacecraft and its "housekeeping"
systems3 and the sensor instrumentation payloads.
Figure 1 shows the redundancy built into the
stabilization and attitude control system.
The large number of spacecraft oper
ations which are controllable from the ground by
command provide a failure protection mode* By
ground command all but essential subsystems can
be set to their off or standby modes of operation,
resulting in a standby mode or minimum spacecraft.
This capability has proved to be quite important
during all phases of system testing as well as
during orbit, when it was important to "sit tight"
and reflect upon performance preparatory to
issuing commands. The ground command capability,
for example, allows selection of different payloads, modes of operation^ voltage levels for
motors, and redundant elements in the command
receiver. It is the key element which allows
energy to be managed during the orbit, thus insur
ing batteries are not discharged at rates higher
than or to levels lower than allowed by their
design. Most pre-programmed on-orbit operations
can be over-ridden from the ground through real
time and stored commands.
2.
Con f igura t ion . Mana gement - Forma 1
configuration management was not an engineering
design requirement. Following release of engi
neering data, design change control formally
restricted alterations to designs and drawings.
A Design Change Control Board met almost daily
to review and act upon proposed changes required
to continue activity, normally general improve
ments in designs were not acceptable reasons for
a change - rather changes were authorized pri
marily because of design errors, manufacturing
or materials problems.
3.
Interface Controls - General Electric
Company practices were followed for defining
electrical, mechanical, and thermal Interfaces
for all components and subsystems provided
internally. These were controlled, by the docu
mented engineering data multistage release
system in effect then.

Interface information necessary for
design of mating components and elements being
developed by'independent internal groups flowed
readily from one to the other* allowing changes
to be made informally during the formative design
period.. .An extensive and most valuable set of
informational drawings were developed, each set
devoted to a particular part of design* e*g«;
a) signal flow; b) command flow; c) grounding
and d) electric power and distribution* Bach'
showed interfaces in detail* with brief verbal
and technical descriptions of the input/output
•matching stages (voltages, impedances,
constants, etc.).

4,
__
Failure mode and effects analyses were conducted
on much of the control •system* especially during
the early phases of design where its impact was
greatest. This technique was just being developed
as a design tool in I960 so its application here
was somewhat of a "first". Later this analysis
was if plied to some of the integration and test
effort including the operational programs *

5.
jfcdglg_ior_De^t^!i - light model space*
craft or major sections (pre -prototype s antenna
And adapter* ' thermal, structural dynamics, separa
tion,. prototype/qualification, electrical systems ,
flight) were fabricated, tested, and evaluated as
farts of the total design cycle. Each is con
sider® J to have contributed significantly to the
final design* hence their inferred contribution
to a long*life design.
6.
Flece Parts- - The Nimbus spacecraft
contains approximately 40300 electronic -type piece
farts* The engineering and pro to type/qua lifica tion
of the control system were built with
coflMercial quality parts (5000) . No testing
or evaluation of parts was done except for brief
test ing of functional performance.
The flight model spacecrafts were built
vith the
commercial quality parts. However,
by the time farts were to be ordered and accumu
lated for producing three flight model spacecraft,
required power aging (burn -in) of piece
part a 9 especially transistors and diodes,
Occasional circuit failures caused by
piece parts occurred* but
elements were
replaced during the almost continuous testing to
wnich the control system, was exposed. Tine: "make
and test" philosophy which was central to the
development of the control system, served effec
tively as paver conditioning and -parts selection
controls. The degree to which
activity
"cost effective" Is problematical* and was never
assessed*
B,
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.1, " Modular layout - 'Hie
design
of the spacecraft provided fieri: 'two
structural
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stabilization
attitude controls 9
pay loads.
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mounted to the sensor ring framework, with "space
grease" at interfaces, providing good thermal
conduction, and in a sense leading the heat to
be dissipated from the spacecraft to those regions
of the ring having either flat panels coated with
paint having a specified ratio of absorptivity
to emmissivity or to panels having Venetian blind
type louvres. Their slats opened in response to
the mechanical motion of a bellows filled with
freon which has a large coefficient of thermalexpansion. In the event the primary bellows
failed, a secondary bellows acted to move the
slats to a fixed 30-degree open position. Failure
has never occurred.

Hoisting the spacecraft and locating it approxi
mately 15 feet from a reflecting surface minimized
this type of interference.
Had electromagnetic susceptibility
requirements been placed on the engineering design
and performance specifications for each subsystem,
most of the noise sensitive problems encountered
during the electrical systems test would never
have occurred nor would the flight data exhibit the
degrees and kinds of interference which they do.
4.
Maintainability - Two features of the
conceptual design characterize the consideration
given to maintenance. The first of these has
already been noted, namely, the modular design of
the sensor ring, the standardized sizes of enclo
sures and the placement of connectors on hardware
allowed easy removal and replacement of components
during the integration test and evaluation activi
ties. The high degree of selective redundancy
allowed alternative operating modes thus minimiz
ing down-time during tests and what is, of course,
most important, failure of the mission in orbit.

A truly benign environment was achieved
in the sensor ring on both Nimbus I and Nimbus II.
Whereas the system design called for a temperature
of 25° + 10 C, the actual temperature range mea
sured during orbit has been close to + 2°C. The
thermal design for the control system was also
extremely conservative. Again passive (paint)
and active (louvres) systems were used. The
actual temperature range measured during orbit has
been close to + 5 C.

An important feature of the Nimbus
design not to be overlooked is the inherent capa
bility which exists for remote "maintenance and
repair" while the spacecraft is in orbit. The
capacity of the command system, directed from the
ground, to accept many alternative directions and
orders, coupled with the data relayed through the
telemetry system, provided a total maintenance
capability which has proven most effective during
the life of Nimbus II. This concept of in orbit
maintenance and repair through cooperative ground
activity should be expanded and applied as part of
the engineering systems design of new spacecraft.

3.
Electromagnetic Compatibility Control Potential electromagnetic interference among the
subsystems through conduction and radiation was
recognized in the very early phases of system
design. However, specifications for the design
and performance of subsystems did not include the
subjects of limiting the levels of electromagnetic
interfering signals within the subsystems nor pro
tection against incoming interfering signals
(susceptibility). Only mild requirements were
included in the power subsystem limiting the gener
ation of sharp pulses which could be placed on the
regulated bus. As a consequence, many electro
magnetic interference problems were generated
immediately as subsystems were interconnected and
during the first series of electrical systems
integration tests.

5.
Command - The large number of commands
capable of ordering functions on the spacecraft
provided the flexibility necessary for alternative
selection of operating payloads and orbital manage
ment of energy. The system allowed 128 coded and
4 unencoded (emergency) commands. Sixteen of the
coded commands could be stored in a memory, to be
actuated at specified times during a given orbit.
These commands could be revised once each orbit.
This large number allowed equipments to be turned
on or off individually and to select among the
redundant alternative modes of operation, as noted
earlier. It is clear, had this capability not
been available to the Nimbus II spacecraft, little
likelihood exists it would have remained as useful a
spacecraft for the long period it has.

The control system was particularly
susceptible to conducted interference pulses prop
agated on the power bus, generated by switching
transients. Most of this susceptance was elimi
nated by revisions in grounding and by filtering.
Camera shutters introduced substantial transients
until the input circuits to the camera subsystems
were revised by substituting inductive for capacitative input circuits. Circuits in the clock and
telemetry subsystems were also susceptible to
power line transients, requiring changes to be
made to them.

6.
Telemetry - Several references already
have been made to the role of the telemetry system
and its alternative modes of operation as con
tributing factors to the long life of Nimbus II.
In spite of the failure of the telemetry system's
tape recorder several months ago, almost the full
status of all subsystems can be monitored nearly
continuously through the real-time telemetry
transmissions. This mode allows reception of status
information by only those properly equipped receiv
ing stations in the tracking network. Without them
real-time data energy management would have been
impossible and the entire spacecraft would have
failed at the time the telemetry system's tape
recorder failed.

In addition to determining and elimi
nating the sources and effects of conducted inter
ference, radiated interference existed. Leads
and cables had to be re-routed; shielded leads
replaced unshielded leads; unbalanced a.c. line
pairs which were twisted were untwisted; balanced
a.c. line pairs which were not twisted were
twisted; many cables were wrapped with metal foil,
some grounded; and fine mesh screening was installed
around cameras.
An electromagnetic anechoic chamber not
being available during systems tests, radiated
interference entered the antennas, energy being
reflected from the laboratory's floor and walls.
17.1-4

An, essential feature of the Nimbus space
craft is the total dependence on the telemetry
system for all systems testing, countdown, launch
and orbital phases. Although provision was avail"
able for transmitting telemetry data through hard
wire connection to a telemetry interfacing con
nector, except during the earliest periods of
testing this method was not used. To provide a
'more realistic situation, all telemetry data were
transmitted through radiation from the telemetry
system's quadra loop antenna system, the data being
picked up by a receiving antenna (s) connected to
the ground station's telemetry receivers. This
allowed assessment of the full telemetry system
under all conditions including the time when the
spacecraft was undergoing environmental tests in
the vacuum./ thermal chamber,
IV.
A.

1.
Very conservatively define the total
environment and the stress levels expected to be
experienced by the subsystem and/or system (the
spacecraft). Include as environments: manu
facturing, ambient, laboratory, handling, shipping,
storage, launch, space,
2.
Separately qualify each prototype sub
system and sensor/instrument payload before in
stalling it into the spacecraft. Study of avail
able specifications indicate for some subsystems
loosely defined demonstrations of performance were
acceptable evidences of qualification. Further,
individual subsystems were not required, at the
time of their initial development, to adhere to
the same single set of evaluative tests to demon
strate qualification of design for space use.
Some subsystems required engineering development
beyond their anticipated scheduled completion
dates, resulting in fully qualified hardware not
being available for installation into the space
craft at the times planned. The GE-operated bench
acceptance test activities screened some mal
functioning equipment, but it also allowed other
marginally-performing equipment to be installed
into the spacecraft.

gli^
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Any effective test and evaluation program is
the fulfillment of a logically planned effort,
the conduct of which is traceable to some under
lying philosophy. The Nimbus test and evaluation
effort, as actually conducted, is the eventual
realization of a set of guidelines established by
NASA/GSFC prior to 1962. . It is understood these
have not changed materially in the intervening
years.

3.
A prototype/qualification spacecraft,
complete with identical equipment, and payload
sensors as will be incorporated into the final
flight spacecraft, and in full operating condition,
including electro-explosive devices, as required,
should be tested in a series of environments simu
lating those anticipated, augmented by appropriate
safety factors as noted in 1. above. The time
duration of testing in a vacuum/thermal environ
ment should be two weeks. The conservative assump
tion is made that a spacecraft whose design is to
be evaluated which could not survive these tests
is poorly designed and is not suitable for a space
program. Obviously all components and subsystems,
even those whose orbital lifetimes are short, must
survive the test period and not constrain the tests.

Designing and manufacturing a complex space
craft is more of an art than a science, and
subject to a large number of alterations and
constraints representative of many unknown, factors
and inter-relations which become apparent during
the development period. A complex spacecraft is
a good example of a system which usually is not
fully operable upon "rolling off the end of the
production line" - the whole is not the sum of its
parts. The performance of a spacecraft, be it an
engineering, prototype/qualification or flight
model, must be evaluated empirically. Performance
of each model must be demonstrated under simulated
conditions representative of the environmental
stresses expected. In essence, tests must supple
ment analyses.

4.
Separately expose to vibration and
vacuum/thermal acceptance tests each flight sub
system and sensor/instrument payload before in
stalling it into the flight spacecraft. For the
most part, equipments destined for flight use were
exposed to the environments noted and to full accep
tance tests. The problems and failures encountered
during the integrated systems level tests indicated
even these tests were not, in many cases, effective
means for screening potential failures. It is pre
sumed, where opportunity existed, equipment intended
for Nimbus II was tested to a better degree than
similar equipment which was incorporated into Nimbus
I. This trend is continuing for successive Nimbus
spacecraft.

This point of view is particularly applicable •
to a space program which is essentially research
and development in .nature, and especially so in a
program which, features a spacecraft of unusual
design and equipment which pushes state-of-art ,
Conventional approaches to establishing reliability
and confidence levels, based upon measurements made
on a relatively large population, simply do not
pertain. Evaluating the performance of the com
pleted spacecraft, however, must not be an isolated
activity; it must be viewed in the context of the
activities of a total program, i.e., test and eval
uation activities should not be isolated from other
activities. Accepting this premise leads to con
sidering test and evaluation requirements very early
in the planning stage of the total program.

5.
Similarly, each flight spacecraft should
be tested to a set of environmental stresses which
define an. acceptance test. Obviously, to conduct
such program requires the spacecraft: to be amply
provided with command capability to allow it to be
thoroughly exercised during the environmental tests;
to be amply instrumented with telemetry to allow
rap id asses sment o f per fG nuance of s ub systerns; and
to communicate between the ground control reception
point and the spacecraft through only a radio link

A basic philosophy to guide test and evalua
tion. activities, expecially at systems level, can
be expressed in seven brief statements.
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(no hardwire), The Nimbus spacecraft is designed
to allow testing to be so accomplished.

It was therefore necessary to institute a
vigorous and carefully documented acceptance test
program for all equipment provided by co-contractors,
with product assurance controls patterned somewhat
after those required by the total spacecraft*
This program only allowed either acceptance or
rejection of the elements of or a complete sub
system, based on functional performance tests in
an ambient laboratory environment. Based on accum
ulated experience, it is postulated 'many functional
performance problems which were encountered during
the systems test program would never have occurred
had each of the subsystems been operated under
appropriate environmental stress conditions for a
time duration sufficient to establish little further
likelihood of additional failures.

6.
A strong policy should be followed mini
mizing the replacement or removal of any equipment
from the spacecraft between the start of flight
acceptance tests and launch. Access to, adjust
ment, or disassembly of the spacecraft or its sub
systems should be discouraged. The system should
remain intact and last-minute changes avoided.
Make no hardware changes at the launch site.
7.
Prior to start of the actual test and
evaluation program, the participating active
ground equipment, facilities, handling mechanisms,
detailed test procedures, and test conductors and
supporting personnel should, in a sense, be
"qualified",
B.

V,

Functions of the GE Test and Evaluation Program

A.

The primary functions of the GE Test and Eval
uation Program can be summed as:

Test and Evaluation Programs

Ba s i c C qns i d e r a. t i on s

To a great extent high emphasis was placed on
the sp a c ec ra ft' s sy s t em, 1 eve 1 te s t and e va lua t ion
p ro g ram ( " - - - - -de s i gn. -1 es t - fix -1 es t - fix- - - - - '*')
because it served as an overall screening function,
to detect and indicate corrective actions which,
had not previously been indicated in the individual
subsystems because of the limited testing; to which
they had. been exposed. System, level testing.,, how
ever, should n.ot be considered as an isolated.
activity; its role must: be part of a comprehensive
test and evaluation program,..

Estimate orbital environments
Establish and prepare general, specific, and
detailed test specifications and procedures
Conduct subsystem tests for equipment pro
vided by GE
Conduct systems test and evaluation using
antenna, structural, thermal, electrical,
prototype/qualification, and flight models

A stru.ctu.ral concept of the test and evalu
ation program, fox Nimbus (and one which is also
applicable to other programs) is shown in Figure 2,
Each level of testing is designed to discover weakne s s e s , a noma 1 o u s b e h a v i Q' r a nd. fa i. lur e s win i, c h
passed through a lower level testing,, and. those
similar characteristics of performance which, may be
generated by interactions created by the .functional/
physical forms associated with that level.

Redesign or recommend redesign., as required,
based on results of the test and evaluation
program
Provide certified personnel, procedures, and
facilities for all tests except the accelera
tion test

Theoretica1ly, i f a suffieiently comprehensive
and, effective test and evaluation program bad 'been
consummated at Level i, failures in testing; at
Level (i+1) should not be anticipated as cowing
from Level i, but rather as coming from unantici*pated causes peculiar to' the total environment
"associated with Level (i+1) . Corrective action.
could therefore be localized and minimized.

Subsystems were intended to have been, evalu
ated prior to their integration into the spacecraft
for system level tests, to the same regime as
planned for the system,, i.e ( , -engineering 3 proto
type/qualification or flight acceptance test levels
to their own specific set of specifications,. Detec
tion of marginal performance conditions, early
wear-out and failures were the primary results to
be achieved from a strong subsystems test program,

Levels 1 to 4 pertain, to the design, ties t, and,
evaluation of subsystems. T'hey are designed to
demonstrate: achievement of design,, goals, perfor
mance, structural and functional integrity, and
assurance particular pieces of hardware are in fact
of sufficiently high quality to be incorporated
into a., flight spacecraft* Presumably, if the flight
acceptance test program at subsystem level does
realistica1ly take into account anticipated environ
mental stresses, and if the subsystem has been
tested for a time period to have eliminated infant
mortality failures, testing at systems level should
encounter pxoblems princIpa1ly attributable to
integrating subsysterns,

Notwithstanding the detailed overall program
planning to have available for systems level test
ing fully qualified, ready to use subsystems,
schedule changes in various parts of the program
resulted in some co*contractor's equipment being
delivered to the General Electric Company in a
not-fully performance-evaluated condition* Each
piece of co-eontrietor 1 s equipment ©r sensor pay*
load was to have passed its prototype/qualifica
tion and/or flight acceptance tests before deliv*
ery for incorporation into the spacecraft,
undetected failure or out-of"specification con
dition which passed these co-contractors 1 screens
theoretically would be picked up in the acceptanct
tests for government-furnished equipment or in flit
systems level tests *

Level 5 ;|l, Systems Testing, encompasses a vide
spectrum of testing activities on the Nimbus pro
gram since it includes evaluation of * large number
11,14

of special-purpose spacecraft models. Final veri
fication of the adequacy of design of the space
craft (as a bus) and its complete integrated payload was demonstrated by the performance of the
prototype/qualification spacecraft under extreme
environmental stresses. Exposing each flight
spacecraft to a flight acceptance test program
wherein it must perform while subjected to
environmental stresses similar to those expected
during and after launch is the ultimate means for
instilling confidence it is ready for launch.

between the
test personnel and the
C0*c0fityact0r0 f ''representative** Existence of
formal procedural documents forced consideration
to be given to the exact environments to be
simulated and to the specification of criteria
for evaluating performance of the individual sub
systems
total spacecraft as an integrated
0 y s tern *

c*
The Test Program for tbe Mimflw* 11 satellite
was based upon tbe wealth of experience
•by its predecessor program, Ninbus I* A full flight

Level 6, Flight Readiness Testing, demon
strates no degradation to have occurred during
transportation from the factory to the launch site,
no short-term degradation to have developed during
the conduct of the launch-site activities, con
cluding with the final checking of the spacecraft f s
critical parameters as part of the launch count
down prior to lift-off.

spacecraft acceptance test program at flight envi
ronmental levels was conducted as were environmental
qualification tests of new subsystem designs* A
full spacecraft qualification program was carried
out for Nimbus 1, but not for Nimbus II,

The complete Nimbus II system test program
constittjted four stages;

In spite of differences which may in reality
have existed between what each level of test
should have accomplished and what it did in fact
accomplish, including both depth and time duration
of testing, the Nimbus 1 and II spacecraft were
exposed to a more comprehensive and longer series
of tests than any other spacecraft developed under
the aegis or at the Goddard Space Flight. Center.
As noted earlier, although causal relations cannot
be established, the fact the Nimbus II spacecraft
has demonstrated exemplary in-orbit performance is
sufficient for other spacecraft programs to con
sider Nimbus 1 test and evaluation program as a
model for planning purposes.
B.

A prototype test program - intended pri
marily to complete the design development and
system integration,
A sensory ring test program - intended
to integrate all flight quality subsystems within
the sensor ring and essentially subject this
identifiable, major part of the spacecraft to
flight acceptance testing,
A spacecraft test program - intended to
integrate all elements of the complete spacecraft
and subject it to flight acceptance testing.

Test Procedures and Plans

A launch test program - intended to pre
pare the flight spacecraft for launch,

The complex nature of the"Nimbus spacecraft
and the many alternative modes of operation pos
sible with the housekeeping and sensor/payload
subsystems preclude leaving to chance its operation
and control. This is especially so during the
initial system level integration tests when test
conductors and supporting personnel are becoming
acquainted with the expensive spacecraft and
supporting test facilities. Careful pre-planning
of all factors of the test and evaluation program
is essential. Simultaneous with intensive reviews
of the first drafts of documents within the
General Electric Company, representatives of
NASA/GSFC, and to some extent co-contractors,
reviewed plans. These were comprehensive and in
step-by-step-detail to insure little likelihood
of errors of omission and/or commission during
the test program. The reviews were not infallible;
corrections in test plans still had to be made
during the conduct of the tests. Following review
and approval by NASA/GSFC representatives,,, the
procedures and test plans were the guiding docu
ments for the actual conduct of systems level
tests,

1.
Prototype Test Program Plan - The proto
type/qualification spacecraft from, the Nimbus I
program was updated to the Nimbus II design con
figuration. It served also as the initial
.for integrating subsystems, the composite resulting
in the Electrical Systems Model for limb us II.
This spacecraft was used for electrical., electronagnetic compatibility control, mechanical and
Interference testing. Following its use within
the test - program, the prototype spacecraft was
exposed to the launch test program in -house and at
the Western Test Range.

2.
Sensor Ring Test. Program Flan - Follow
ing physical Installation of flight quality hard
ware into the sensor ring, the subsystems were
energized to form an operating system. Electrical
te s t Ing e 1 Imlna ted technica 1 d 1 sc repanc ie s , int e r ferences and Incompatibilities not previously
encountered in the prototype test program. Follow
ing the electrical testing, the sensor ring as a
major subasserafoly was subjected to an acceptance
test program designed as a prelude to a similar
program for the entire spacecraft..,

Several auxiliary advantages result from the
preparation of these plans* Their value as educa
tional and training aids is unquestioned* Each
participant having a defined responsibility for
part of the test program is forced to pre-plan, his
activities and to consider the impacts and impli
cations of his activities on those of other sub
systems* Close working relations developed

3»
Flight., Spacecraft Test. Program Plan The flight spacecraft was subjected to a compre
hensive acceptance test program, including vibra
tion testing; at levels for the Thrust Augmented
Thor»Ageaa launch vehicle QfLmbus j wa§ placed in
orbit by the, Thor-Agena vehicle)
tbetaial
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vacuum conditions. Briefly, the attitude control
subsystem (the upper section of the spacecraft)
was mated to the sensor ring, and the spacecraft "-s
electrical and mechanical integrity was established.
Significant performance characteristics are mea
sured before and after each major environmental
exposure. Tuneable antennas were adjusted prior
to shipment to the Western Test Range.

programs with the exception of a small number of
components. Therefore, the design being qualified
by the integrated systems test program was essen
tially an evaluation of the spacecraft as a
bus/carrier and of the mechanical and electrical
interfaces among any subsystem and among the sub
systems and the spacecraft, created by the instal
lation of the subsystems into the spacecraft.

4.
Launch Test Program Plan - The launch
test program included a series of pre-shipment
tests, tests after receipt at the Satellite
Assembly Building (SAB/WTR), and tests on the
launch pad after the spacecraft was mated to the
launch vehicle. Pre- and post-shipment tests
were preceded by a low- level (workmanship) vibra
tion test to insure the absence of extraneous or
loose parts.

The purpose of the program specifically
was not to evaluate the design of the subsystems,
although their performances in the system test pro
gram did result in recommendations for the redesign
of some of them. The test program neither ascer
tains the true levels of stresses which result from
the exposure nor are the tests made to establish
stress levels to failure since only one spacecraft
is available and it cannot be tested to destruction.

D.
Aspects of the Qualification and Flight
Acceptance Test Programs

Realistic simulation of performance of
the spacecraft can only be achieved if the space
craft is in fact energized and operating as it
would normally operate in the expected environment.
Thus, during the vibration test there were ener
gized the command receiver, the power system on
batteries, the telemetry/beacon transmitter, and
the drive motor on the High Resolution Infra-red
Radiometer. During the vacuum/thermal tests, all
subsystems which would normally operate in orbit
were exercised as part of simulated in-orbit oper
ations. Commands were received and acted upon,
subsystems were turned on and off, measurements
were made by sensors activated by appropriate
stimulators, television cameras recorded projected
test patterns,
sensor and telemetry data were
stored on tape recorders, and data were trans
mitted through radio in both the real-time and
stored data modes of information transfer.

1.
Prototype/Qualification Test Program The concepts developed for evaluating the perfor
mance of the complete Nimbus spacecraft repre
sented a substantial departure from those applied
to other spacecraft developed in the same time
period. Even at the start of the Nimbus program
in 1960 there already had been outlined the basic
elements of the qualification test program. These
were specifically defined in a set of test speci
fications which described the five environments
and the stress levels to which the qualification
spacecraft was to be exposed as part of the systems
integration and test program. Four elements per
taining to the specification and the test program
should be noted:
a) The purpose of the qualification
test program was to discover basic and/or inherent
weaknesses in the design of the entire spacecraft
packaged in a form which represented the flight
spacecraft.

Exercising the spacecraft effectively
implies the existence of two additional necessary
factors - instructions and personnel. The quali
fication test program was conducted in response
to sets of essentially step-by-step instructions
embodied in written detailed test plans which were
continually reviewed and revised. Personnel oper
ating the spacecraft were being trained to be
called upon later to operate the flight spacecraft
in its acceptance test program and in orbit.
Operational systems planning was completed and
written in detail. Computer programs were devised
for use with the telemetry data to allow its
reformatting, special read-outs, energy balance,
conversion from binary digital counting to practi
cal engineering units of measure, and other factors
as desired. These were all essentially completed
and ready at the start of the simulated flight
operations tests in the vacuum/thermal test chamber.
Similar preparations, suitably up-dated,, were made
as part of the flight acceptance test program..

b) The performance of the entire space
craft was to be evaluated while it was in the
operating condition expected during that portion
of its flight history being simulated by the
environmental exposure.
c) Stress levels for vibration tests
were to be set at approximately 150% of those
expected by the flight spacecraft (95% level)
during launch and placement into orbit. The
extremes of temperature were set by specifying
an increase of + 10°C of those expected during
orbit.
d) The order of exposure to the five
environments were:

The simulated flight tests started with
the spacecraft on the launch pad, with appropriate
equipment in full operating condition as they would
be in truth. At lift-off, the pressure in the
vacuum/thermal chamber was reduced,, simulating the
expected change in pressure/altitude. Subsystems
were energized (solar paddles were in the unfolded
position)., monitored, and exercised on a real time
'basis as they would be in the early and later
orbits after several days following launch., all
such activity in accordance with the guidelines

Humidity
Vibration
Acceleration
Pre-vacuum/Therma1
Va cuum/ The rma 1
As noted earlier, the systems test pro
grams were concerned with evaluating performance
of the integrated spacecraft. The subsystems
which were provided as government-furnished equip
ment 'had completed their own qualification test
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of stress for these tests comfortable margins of
safety were chosen. While inside the "space
chamber" for the vacuum/thermal tests, the space
craft was exposed to radiant heating to achieve
the specified profile. All temperatures were
measured on the spacecraft ! s most massive non-heat
producing section, part of the sensor ring. The
structure had mounted thereon a number of tempera
ture detectors. The lowest temperatures read on
the structure was taken to be the level specified
as the high temperature, and the highest tempera
ture on the structure was taken as the level
specified as the lowest temperature. Temperature
readings were made when the pressure was less than
or equal to 10" mm Hg; the rate of pressure
change was to be no greater than the pressure/time
profile expected in flight. The spacecraft was
interrogated bi-hourly, looking for any changes or
anomalous performance which would be interpreted
as a forerunner of an equipment failure or harmful,
but slow degradation or out-of-specification con
dition.

and instructions embodied in the operational
systems documents. Commands to the spacecraft
were generated by the Test Director, written
and forwarded to the ground command equipment,
and then transmitted via radio to the space
craft's command receiver. Telemetry and sensor
derived data were transmitted from the space
craft via radio to the ground receiving equip
ment. Antennas were mounted inside the vacuum/
thermal chamber to permit this transmission.
Hardwire communications to and from the space
craft was not permitted. There was no access
to the normal test points used in the develop
ment or subsystems test programs.
During the several days operation,
thermal stress cycling was provided with real
time and/or near real-time evaluation of all
data transmitted from the spacecraft. All
decisions regarding the performance of the
spacecraft and its subsystems were made on the
basis of data emitted by the spacecraft. It
was necessary to rapidly interpret data, and
assess whether the test program should cease
because of the exhibition of malfunctions,
anomalous behavior, or failure. These require
ments provided on-the-job training for the test
conductor, the entire test crew, the personnel
operating the ground equipment, and all NASA
personnel who were later to be faced with true
situations.

As data have been accumulated over the
past several years, and the skills of spacecraft
designers have improved, the needs for these
extremes have diminished and tighter tolerances
will no doubt be specified.
While the qualification test program
pertained specifically to the Nimbus I program, a
partial qualification test program was in effect
for Nimbus II. The sensor ring with its subsystems/
experiments were exposed to a qualification test
program, including exposures to humidity, gas leak,
vibration, acceleration, and vacuum/ thermal.

When the environmental test speci
fication was written, a comparatively limited
amount of data were available regarding the
vibration environment during the launch phase.
A central problem attendant to an environmental
test program is the establishment of appropriate
stress levels. The vibration specification was
based upon the knowledge available at the time
for the Atlas/Agena launch vehicle, updated as
more data became available between the time of
the initial specification and the time of the
tests. The stress level for the vibration test
was set to be a 99% probability level, i.e.,
during flight, there would be only one chance
in a hundred the flight spacecraft would experi
ence a vibration environment more severe than
that experienced by the prototype/qualification
spacecraft in its test program. Assuming a
Gaussian distribution of the vibration stress
levels, the 99% level is set at the mean level
(i.e., the mean vibration level expected based
upon actual measurements) plus 1.5 times the
difference between the mean level and the 95%
level. In essence, the 150% vibration test
level is based on the 95% level on a Gaussian
distribution of expected stresses not on the
150% of the mean value. Thus, all test levels
are far more severe than the average stress
level which may be encountered in a flight.
The duration of the vibration test was selected
to give assurance the flight units would survive
the environments imposed both in the acceptance
tests and in the actual launch activity.

Two additional factors were necessary
before initiating the qualification test program:
1) Criteria and/or guidelines to judge
whether the spacecraft and its full complement of
installed equipment "passed" the qualification test.
2) An operating plan to define what
should be done in the event of failure of an element
during the test program.
Formal and rigid acceptance criteria
were not established during the qualification test
program. Presumably, the absence of formal tech
nical criteria provided the NASA Project and Space
craft Managers with more freedom to exercise tech
nical judgments related to program flight schedule,
and expenditure commitments. Collective technical
judgment is a most important factor and quite cor
rectly should take precedence over detailed formal
planning, which should be subject to amendment as
the test program proceeds. In a sense, this was
acceptable since in many cases quantitative descrip
tions of performance would not have had firm bases
for their specification. For example, although the
resolution of the television camera system had been
quoted at 800 lines (in one diameter inch tube),
this actually pertained only to the central section
of the tube. If 700 lines resolution were found in
a tube, this would hardly be cause for rejecting
the spacecraft. As the test program developed,
specific criteria were formulated for some sub
systems. The NASA Project Manager relied heavily
on the judgment of the members of the Nimbus

»
The temperatures to which the space
craft would be exposed in orbit,
the quality
of the thermal design and the temperature regu
lating system were not known with high confidence.
Consequently, in establishing the extreme levels
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The stress levels used in the flight
acceptance tests were the best estimates of these
anticipated in the launch/flight environment. The
test levels were to be no greater than those
expected in these environments. In the case of
the vibration tests, the stress level was set by
first assuming a Gaussian distribution of vibration
levels (based on accumulated experience). The test
level was the 957o probability level, i.e., one
chance in twenty this level would be exceeded dur
ing the actual launch. The 95% level is the 1.650*
point.

Environmental Test Committee, whose membership
included NASA/GSFC and GE representatives. This
group monitored, reviewed, and recommended changes
in the rationale for testing and evaluating test
data, and it reviewed all test data and made
recommendations to the NASA Project Manager as to
whether the spacecraft and its installed equipment
met design objectives and was qualified.
retest plan was formu
The rejection
lated before the start, of the program. Its essent ia 1 features were:

An innovation introduced into the vibra
tion test program for Nimbus II was the use of
notching techniques. The combination of the space
craft and the drive power/frequency characteristics
of the vibration table were such that if the orig
inal amplitude/frequency specification were adhered
to, the spacecraft structure could be overs tressed.
Analysis and vibration survey data indicated fre
quency bands wherein the drive power of the vibra
tion table should be reduced with no resulting
deleterious effect on the purposiveness of the
vibration test program. These specific notch
points were then incorporated as part of the final
specification for the vibration tests.

a) If the spacecraft is rejected before,
during, or after an exposure, discontinue the
exposure .
b) Determine the cause of failure, and
co rrec t i t a, inc lud ing any d e s i gn defects.
c) Starting at the event, timing, tem
perature where the failure occurred, repeat the
complete test program until successful.
Flight Acceptance Test Program - Little
2.
differentiated the flight acceptance program for
the Nimbus I and II spacecraft. Basically, the
same set of environmental specifications pertained.
Whereas the qualification test program searched
for inherent design weaknesses, the flight accepprogram could be characterized by the following:

The same rejection and test plan was
stipulated for the flight acceptance test program
as for the qualification test program, and just
as easily interpreted on the basis of program
needs as in the earlier tests.

a) 'The purpose of this test program was
to determine the flight, worthiness of the flight
spacecraft and to discover workmanship defects
and/or errors in use of materials.

In addition to the systems test program
for the entire Nimbus II spacecraft, the sensor
ring with all equipment installed was exposed to
a flight acceptance test program in all environ
ments, and with its own vacuum/thermal test cycle.

b) The performance of the entire space
craft, which, was to be an exact replica of the
p ro t o^ t yp e / qua 1 i, f i ca t i on. spa cec r a f t., wa s to b e
evaluated, in the' operating, condition expected
during, that portion of its flight history being
simulated by the environmental exposure.

The rejection and retest plan was not
followed, in spite of its good intentions. Pro
gram management considerations, trading off per
formance, cost, and schedule factors resulted in
continued testing in accordance with the planned
profile, following repairs or replacement of failed
equipments, rather than recycling the tests.

c) Stress levels were to be set at
approximately 100% of those expected by the flight
spacecraft during launch and orbit...

Launch Pad Test Program - The test pro
3.
gram at the Western Test Range was conducted to
ascertain that the flight spacecraft had not
suffered any detrimental damage in being shipped
from GE/VFSTC to WTR.

d) 'The order of exposure to the three
environments were:
Vibration
Pre - va cuum/Therma 1
Va cuum/Therma 1
Since flight acceptance testing; follows
the qualification acceptance test of a single
spacecraft, no prior knowledge has been developed
regarding, the expected variations among supposedly
identical spacecraft.. The assumption is made no
variation exists, which, of course,, is statisti
cally invalid, but economically wholesome* On.
the presumption that all design, defects have been
eliminated as a, result of the qualification test
program, the flight acceptance test program is
presumed to screen only for workmanship and /or
material errors and defects* That this is not so
Is ably demons tra t ed by analysis of the failures
ing the flight acceptance test proI, Nimbus II, and many other
________for which comparable data,
hav

VI.
A.

Analys is of Failure Records
- System Tests and Flight

The Raw Data

Quantitative analyses were made to determine
causes of anomalous behavior, out of specification
performance, and/or failures of components and
subsystems which form the total spacecraft, encoun
tered during the flight acceptance tests for Nimbus
I and II and their performances in orbit. All
available reports within the General Electric
Company pertaining to these system tests were
individually examined, including: System Failure
Reports; Malfunction Reports; Final Test Reports;
and Flight Reports* These data were supplemented
by records of in orbit malfunctions as reported
in GE-originated reports. Failure data pertaining
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to the Prototype/Qualification Test Program were
not reviewed at this time,

Design a thermally benign environment for all
equipment, to the greatest extent possible,

B.

- Provide a structure and heat control
ling system having high thermal inertia,.

Method of Data Analysis

The principle method of analysis of the raw
data is categorization into factors of interest,
showing for each classification the absolute
numbers of occurrences. The general classifica
tions are by:

- Provide a thermally conservative design
whereby the heat dissipating capability is much
greater than the heat producing sources,
- Provide for thermal load sharing in
the event of failure or removal of planned equip
ment.

1.
Importance of the failure to the sue- .
cessful operation of the mission or of the sub
system.
2.

Long life in orbit may be greatly enhanced by:

Attributed cause of failure.

- Condition/power-age piece parts before
installation, into components.

3.
Environment and test activity existing
at the time of failure.

- Specify conservative stress conditions
and environments for systems level tests.

4.
Level of testing, other than system
level, at which the failure could have been
detected.

C.

5.

Subsystem.

6.

Type and complexity of subsystem.

7.

Source of hardware.

- Apply experienced engineers to design,
test and evaluate subsystems and the spacecraft.
- Incorporate functional redundancy
an appropriate command system to allow ground
control.
- Provide a benign thermal environment
to minimiz e in -orb i t the rma 1 st re s se s,

Significant Failures Encountered

The most significant failures encountered
during the Nimbus I Prototype/Qualification, Nimbus
I Flight and Nimbus II Flight Systems Acceptance
Test Programs are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
VII.

B-

Lessons Learned and Applied

The experiences encountered during the develop
ment of the Nimbus I and II spacecraft may have
application to other space programs.
A.

Test"Operations

Qualification tests were not made to destruc
tion levels y hence mo real measure exists of the
degree of conservative design in the spacecraft.
There is no way to evaluate the applicability of
all tests to which the spacecraft and/or subsystems
were exposed.
Operate each subsystem under normal conditions
(life-test) after passing its flight acceptance test
to discover latent failures. This would reduce
failures and anomalies encountered during the more
expensive integrated systems test program.

Design Practices

Provide extensive alternative modes of func
tional redundancy as a means of failure protection,
thus enhancing long life potential.

Expose the spacecraft to an orderly planned
series of tests, each successively encompassing a
larger number of subsystems which require integrated
performance.»

Provide an extensive command system with
ground command override for programmed functions
to effectively use alternative modes of operation.

Flan the test and evaluation activities early
in the program, preferably concurrently with engi
neering design* Potential problems in the conduct
of system tests and simulated orbital operations will be exposed early,

Fabricate all cables and wire groupings on a
full-scale, exact replica three dimensional mock-up
model spacecraft. This minimizes stresses and
strains in wiring and connectors,
Give most attention in design and test to non
electronic and complex equipments, since most fail
ures and anomalies occur here*

The 'best efforts expended in: conservative
design, engineering, management and test practices.;,,
selection, and training of personnel are still not
sufficient to absolutely screen, and eliminate all
latent failures from, individual subsystems or
the complete spacecraft* A strong test and evalu
ation program helps to isolate these types o£
failures prior to launch; e.g»>

Be wary of all specifications for components
and subsystems which contain idealized, "text book"
conditions for design* test and performance; e,g«,

a transmitter designed for a 50 ohm resistive load
which actually is to be connected to a transmission
line, impedance matcher and antenna,

- The control system on
I, after
more than 750 hours of operation, including
weeks of vacuum/thermal testing.

- Evaluate all equipment under conditions
of the total expected environment.

VIVM1

- The (2N768) transistor in the command
clock failed after more than 1000 hours of oper
ation, in spite of conservative circuit design and
power conditioning of piece parts.

Provide
sistent with
engineering,
professional

C.

- Better use is made of accumulated
experience than if frequent training and retrain
ing is required.

Failure Records and Analyses

Report and record all failures and anomalous,
out-of-specification performance of components 9
subsystems and the spacecraft system as soon as
observed.

long term personnel assignments con
separable phases/elements of the
test and evaluation program and the
interests of the personnel.

- Methods are developed for the expe
ditious conduct of routine tasks.

- Provide expeditious diagnosis and
determination of the specific reason for the fail
ure.

- Develops healthy inter-personal
relations among members of the project team.

- Provide closed-loop record of the
action taken.

Rehearse all new test activities and phases
of the test program using the previously published
detailed test plan containing step-by-step instruc
tions .

- Analyze and record failures and final
actions taken on a near real time basis. Failure
records are intended to be used for management
control, not for purposes of historical record.
D.

F.

Documentation

- Show individual schematics for:
grounding, power, command, telemetry.

Write all plans, specifications, requirements
and procedures necessary for a test and evaluation
program in detail, step by step, before the start
of the functional activity,

signal,

- Very useful in system trouble shooting
and planning operational activities.

Focus attention on specific problems as they
arise through rigorous use of the detailed test
requirements and plans documents.

Require design reviews for all hardware developed.
- The periodic reviews cover activities
from the initial concept through qualification test
ing.

- Confidence is provided to the Test
Conductor and to the Program Manager by isolating
activities and problems.
E.

Technical Reviews

Prepare information flow schematics early in
the program.

- Personnel responsible for hardware
must be made to understand the review is an essen
tial part of the design cycle, intended to help
them strengthen the design, and is not a "police"
action.

Personnel

Define fully all responsibilities and author
ities vested in personnel directly handling, work
ing on or operating the spacecraft.

- Technically strong, competent, per
ceptive personnel should lead design review activ
ities and recommend action.

- Do not permit random assumptions to
replace such assignment,

- All action items resulting from a
review are accountable to be accomplished as part
of the design effort.

- Avoid misunderstandings which can
lead to strained inter-personal relations and con
sequent loss of operating efficiency.

Permanently staff the program with Senior
Consulting Engineers. Their need and contributing
value were well recognized by the Program Manage
ment .

Certify spacecraft Test Conductors as to their
ability to operate the spacecraft, to supervise
the test program, and to take effective measures
should an emergency arise.

- The Nimbus program had two,, one in
the area of mechanical engineering, another in the
area of electrical/electronic engineering and
sys terns,

- Provide a unique certificate.
Encourage and train all personnel, through
direct, conscious management effort, to be per
formance oriented, technically honest, and to
demonstrate integrity,

- Each had full responsibility and author
ity for overview of the overall technical perfor
mance of the electrical and mechanical systems and
to enter into any technical area for analysis/review
and to recommend changes to all levels of partici
pating personnel and management,

- Personnel should feel free to expose
errors and faux pas without fear of management
discipline either to themselves or to others.

The GSFC 'Nimbus Environmental Test Committee

Establish a highly disciplined environment
for the test and evaluation program wherein each
participant knows his job and the personal impact
he has on the total task.
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provided independent guidance directly to the
NASA/GSFC Project Manager regarding: Test Program;
Test Levels; Acceptance of Test Results; le-fest
Requirements,

- GE had two members on this committee,
the two Consulting Engineers, responsible for the
areas of "Electronic Systems" and "Design and
Reliability".
A Launch Readiness Review preceded certifica
tion of flight readiness of the spacecraft.

TABLE I
MAJOR FAILURES DISCOVERED DURING

INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM NIMBUS I PROTOTYPE SPACECRAFT

Potential
Effect
on
Mission

Attributed Cau.se
of Failure

System Test
Related?

HRIR
Loss of synchronizing
signal

Catastrophic to
the HRIR subsystem

Mechanical redes igp of
the mount for the mag
netic pulse pickup which
moved when vibrated

Functional design

No

AVCS TAPE RECORDER
Shaft of recorder broke
in vibration test

Catastrophic to stored
AVCS data

Component redesigned

Functional design

No

Failed as a result
of extreme tests;
failure occurred
during a second
vibration test at the
prototype/qualifica
tion test levels.

COMMAND CLOCK
One transistor (2N768)
exhibited excessive
leakage current after
more than 1000 hours
operation

Catastrophic to total
mission

Bo'Ught-off,
Replaced the piece
part with another of
the same type.

Parts/material

No

Circuit was very
conservatively de
signed with respect
to expected variations
in the transistor's
parameters. This
explains the long
time period of operating
without failure.

ATTITU DE C ON TRO L
Solenoid valves overheated

Po t en t i a 1 ly ca ta s t rop h i c
to total mission

Replaced overheated
solenoids with others
of the same type

Test procedure

No

Subject

Action Taken
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Remarks

j

Solenoids had not
failed in performance;
• insulation appeared
damaged; replaced to
enhance confidence.

TABLE 2

MAJOR FAILURES DISCOVERED DURING
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM
NIMBUS I FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Potential
Effect on
Mission

Attributed Cause
of Failure

System Test
Related?

CORONA

Catastrophic to
the television camera
systems.
Degraded and reduced
performance of the
telemetry system

Redesigned television
cameras and electric
power distribution
systems to remove
the sources of corona

Functional design

Yes

ATTITUDE CONTROL AUXILIARY
The potentiometer signal to the
automatic day/night switch
in the television cameras was
noisey

The camera systems
could be made in
operative by improperly
turning on and off their
power supplies.
Mission operations
would have been
hampered.

Bought-off,
Over-ride command
capability controls
power to the cameras

Functional design

Yes

AVCS AND MRIR TAPE RECORDERS
Leaks in the pressurized
containers

Long term degradation
of performance

Leaks repaired but
containers were not
redesigned

Functional and other
design

No

Functional design

Yes

of subsystems;
of filters in
redesign and
•Melding of electric power
distribution
system

Functional design

Yes

Subject

MI TT ER
A VC S S- BAN D T
Marginal automatic
turn-off signal
ELECTROMAGNETIC
CONTROL
Conducted interference through
transient pulses on power system
caused by switching some
equipment

total

to the
through
of

of ieniori/paylofid and
orbital
in
difficult

on m

Action Taken

the switching
gystem,
an

to

turn-off

Radiated interference from
sub- system to subsystem

Degraded
of sensors/payload

Minimized by shielding
cables

Functional design

Yes

Mierophonics on camera tube

Degraded performance

Redesign; mounting washers
(Viton) installed to isolate
camera tube component

Other design

Yes

TKLOIF.TUY TAPE RECORDER
HH1K TAPE RECORDER
Lubrication failures following
vacuum 'thermal tests.

Degraded performance
leading to catastrophic
failure of stored
telemetry and URIR data

Recorders were replaced
with identical units having
fresher lubricant

Parts/ material

No

AT TITrDE CONTROL
Short circuit of regulated bus
power because of failure in
irsulation

Catastrophic to total
mission

Replaced wiring

Other design and
fabrication

No

TELEMETRY
Distortion of PCM signal
at output of the transmitter

Degraded performance
of the telemetry system

Redesign of transmitter to
allow wide variation of load
impedance at the trans
mitter output.
Redesign of the phasing
transmission line to provide
more uniform parameters.

Functional

Yes

APT

Remarks

The redesign
of
not to the
which would
In a
to
corona- inducing
environ merit,

Ti m e/ < *n

m

failure

Thermal stress
11 ow of
insulation

TABLE 3

MAJOR FAILURES DISCOVERED DURING
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM NIMBUS II FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Subject

Potential Effect
on Mission

Action Taken

Attributed Cause
of Failure

Degraded performance
of sensors/payload

Redesign of HRffi (internal
shielding) and improved
shielding of electrical power
and signal distribution
system

Functional design

Yes

Degraded performance
of clock

Redesigned circuits
in clock

Functional design

Yes

Long term degradation
of performance

Leaks repaired but con
tainer was not redesigned

Functional and other
design

No

Degraded performance

Replaced relay with no
other change

Parts /mate rial

No

Lessened margin of
gaiety lor receiving
commands

Bought Off.
Problem disappeared
after exposure to
vacuum; presumably
component dried.

Parts/material

No

Degraded performance
of Camera No, 2

Replaced the vidicon
camera tube

Parts/material

No

Bough t-off.

Parts/materials

No,

Replaced Infra reil Scanner
Amplifier (IHSA) and Amp
lifier. The specific c nil so
of failure was not found;
the problem \\;is not
duplieateil

Other <l,-M»n.
Kabrk-utioii
Partis/Material

N<>

Motor was re-lubricated
No design change although
it is known motor is of
marginal design for its
application

Functional design

No

System Test
Related?

ELECTROMAGNETIC
COMPATIBILITY CONTROL
Conducted interference from
sub-system to sub-system;
BRffi/APT/MRIR

interference affecting
clock

m.
\
ot

m

by

I

of flic
at

• None since telemetry
System does not operate
at +35°C; degraded per
formance would result.
if the spacecraft would
operate at this elevated
temperature

ATTITUDE CONTROL
IXJ&K oi the ' f /V f scanner
video .signal

Catastrophic to the total
mission

MHIII
Radiometer motor stopped

Catastrophic to the per
formance of the MRtR
sub-system

Remarks

MOMENTUM
TRANSFER.

INERTIA WHEELS (P)

FLIGHT

GAS EXPULSION (P)

LEVEL 6

STABILIZATION AND _
ATTITUDE CONTROL"

LEVEL 5

INTEGRATING GYRO IN
RATE MODE (P)

ACCEPTANCE

LEVEL 4

COARSE SUN SENSOR (S)

LOW VOLTAGE
10 v, rmB (P)

28 v,
SOL
ARRAY
DRIVE

SUN
SENSORS

LEVEL 3

LEVEL 2
{§)

(P f S)

1

PABALLFL
OPFRATION

P - PRIMARY
S - SECONDARY

Figure 1. Functional and Block Redundancy-Spacecraft Subsystems
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